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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MARGARET ANN CRAIN, on be- '
half of ROG ER LUKE CRAIN and
JACKIE SUE CRAIN, dependent
minor children of ELMER LEROY
CRAIN,
Petitioner,

v.

Case No.
11002

,i\T.

S. HATCH COlHPANY, THE
STATE INSURANCE FUND and
THE INDUSTRIAL COl\11\IISSION OF UTAH,
Defendants.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
Petitioner seeks review of an order of the Utah
State Industrial Commission entered July 25, 1967,
denying her petition for payment directly to her of the
allowance awarded the minor children.
1

DISPOSITION IN THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION
The commission denied petitioner's request by
petition for payment of the minor children's allowance
directly to her, with the result that the allowance continued to be held in trust for the sole use and benefit
of the dependent children, as provided in the award
as originally granted March 24, 1967.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants submit that the Utah State Industrial
Commission's order denying the petition for payment
of the dependent and minor children's allowance should
be affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants will accept the statement of facts as
set forth by the petitioner, but for the following additions.
In the report filed with the Utah State Industrial
Commission by the Salt Lake County Department of
Public Welfare concerning the investigation of peti·
tioner' s case, it appears that: "Actually, Mrs. Crain is
managing financially and isn't basing her request as
much on the basis of need as on other reasons." (R.31).
Further, it was observed that, "She is not pleading
2

poverty. She, herself, is investing in real estate and
has other assets." ( R.32).
It appears in the record that the commission has,
on request of the petitioner, given its approval for
expenditures on the trust funds for necessities required
by the dependent children ( R.24-25, 30) .

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION PLACING THE
AMOUNT AWARDED TO THE DEPENDENT MINOR CHILDREN IN TRUST WAS
WITHIN THE DISCRETION GRANTED
THAT BODY BY STATUTE, AND ITS ORDER
DENYING PETITIONER'S REQUEST THAT
THE AMOUNT BE PAID DIRECTLY TO
HER FOR THE USE OF THE CHILDREN
CAN IN NO WAY BE SAID TO BE ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS.
There can be no doubt that the Utah State Industrial Commission was acting completely within its statutory discretion when it placed the amount of the award
to the two minor dependent Crain children in trust
for their sole use and benefit.
The Utah State Legislature, by Repl. Vol. Code
Ann. § 35-1-73 (1966), empowered the commission to
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grant awards to dependents m case of death in the
following language:
The benefits in case of death shall be paid to
such one or more of the dependents of the decedent for the benefit of the dependents, as may
be determined by the commission, which may
apportion the benefits among the dependents
in such ma111ner as it deems just and equitable ...
The dependents, or persons to whom benefits are
paid, shall apply the same to the use of the several beneficiaries thereof in compliance with the
finding and direction of the commission ...
(Emphasis added.)
This court, in Sizemore v. Industrial Comm'n of
Utah, 4 Utah 2d 126, 288 P.2d 788 (1955), has stated
at 288 P .2d 789, 790, "This statute [Repl. Vol. Utah
Code Ann. § 35-1-73 ( 1966) } clothes the commission
with broad powers to distribute the award in such manner as it deems will best serve the interests, needs and
welfare of the parties." (Emphasis added.)
Further the Industrial Commission is given con·
tinuing jurisdiction to: " ... From time to time make
such modifications or change with respect to former
findings, or orders with respect thereto, as in its opinion
may be justified . . . " Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-78 (1966).
The general statute of this state dealing with con·
struction of the statutes, commands: "The statutes . · ·
and their provisions and all proceedings under them
are to be liberally construed with a view to effect the

4

objects of the statutes and promote justice." Repl. Vol.
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 (1961).
This court, in Barber Asphalt Corp. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 103 Utah 371, 379, 135 P.2d 266, 270 (1943),
and North Beck Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 58
Utah 486, 489, 200 Pac. 111, 112 (1921), has stated:
"The Industrial Act, including the procedure therein
provided, must be liberally construed with the purpose
of effectuating its beneficient and humane objects."
The commission's practice of placing a wards in
tru~t for certain dependent beneficiaries thereof, has
been one of long-standing administrative regularity and
has been recognized by this court. In Utah Fuel Co. v.
Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 65 Utah 100, 107, 108,
234 Pac. 697, 699, 700 (1925), it was held that the employer and insurance carrier could not object to paying
the award accessed against them to a banking institution in trust for beneficiaries, in that: "[T]he Commission has full power to determine how, when, and
to whom payments shall be made for the use and benefit
of dependent."
Though not at issue, it was recited in Tintic Mining
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 60 Utah 261, 207
Pac. 1114 (1922), that the amount of the award had
been placed in trust.
Thus, in view of the broadly termed legislative grant
to the commission, the fact that it has been given continuing jurisdiction, and judicial recognition by this
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court that the commission has been vested with broad
discretion, it cannot be doubted that the commission has
the power to place amounts awarded to minor dependents in trust. To hold otherwise would be to cripple
its ability in certain cases to fulfill its statutory duty
to minor dependents.
Defendants recognize that the commission cannot
exercise its authority in an arbitrary or capricious manner and submit that its exercise in petitioner's case
was neither.
This court has stated in Sizemore v. Industrial
Comm'n, supra, that in the absence of a showing that
the actions of the commission in apportionment of awards
were capricious, arbitrary, or unreasonable to the extent
that they amounted to a failure to exercise discretion,
such actions must be affirmed. In Woodburn v. Industrial Comm'n, 111 Utah 393, 399, 181 P.2d 209, 212
( 1947) , this court, citing previous decisions, held the ,
standard to be as follows:
'Unless therefore it can be said, upon the whole
record, that the commission clearly acted arbitrarily or capriciously in making its findings
and decision, this court is powerless to interfere.
* * * It was not intended, * * * that this court,
in matters of evidence, should to any extent substitute its judgment for the judgment of the
. . '
comm1ss1on.
Petitioner herself, is not a dependent under the
act; " . . . No person shall be considered as dependent
unless he is a member of the family of the deceased
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employee, or bears to him the relationship of husband
or wife. . . . " Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-71
(1966).
Inasmuch as petitioner is not a "dependent" the
situation here is not analogous to the fact~ of Davis v.
Industrial Comm'n, 109 Utah 87, 164 P.2d 740 (1945),
as contended by petitioner, as in that case the award
was made to the widow and children, all of them being
dependent, while in the present case such award was
made to the minor children only, the petitioner not being
a dependent. Thus, the award here was not made to a
family unit but directly to the dependent minor children and the rationale of the Davis case is inapplicable.
Defendents further submits that petitioner is in
no way aided by contending that an extension of the
rationale of the case of New Park Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 2 Utah 2d 202, 271 P.2d 842 (1954),
is in order, as that case concerned the termination of
payment on an amount awarded the dependent. Here,
there is no termination, and the issue is how and when
payment is to be made, and not if it is to be made.
Petitioner alleges that the funds are completely
withheld. As it will be seen from the commission's
order making the award (R.22), and by its authorizations for expenditudes of trust funds ( R. 24-25, 30),
the trust funds are presently available for necessities
required by the minor dependents on application by
the petitioner and approval by the commission.
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Petitioner further contends that a basic criticism
of the commis!)ion's order is that it arbitrarily sets the
family's living standard at a level below what is necessary. Defendants submit that this conclusion is unwarranted as the investigation conducted by the Salt
Lake County Welfare Department does not bear out
this assertion. Its report represented the family as,
"Managing financially," and stated the request for release of the trust funds was not based on need as much
as other factors (R.31), and that petitioner was not
"pleading poverty," but had assets of her own and was
was investing in real estate (R.32).

r

Defendants submit that the assumption of the •
welfare report (R.32), that the disproportionate re·
sources available as between the two Crain children
and the child of the Barrett marriage may lead to a
family disharmony at a later date, as relied on by petitioner in support of her request, is not a sufficiently
tangible ground on which to base a reversal of the com·
mission's considered decision founded on a view of the
present income, needs and long-term best interest of
the minor children. It is as plausible and as substantial,
defendants suggest, that family disharmony might re- 1
sult at a later date, when these three children reach
their majority, the Barrett child being well endowed
to make her chosen start in life, and the two Crain
children, on reaching majority, finding their trust funds
are exhausted, and their opportunities limited. Obvi- '
ouslv, the children's circumstances can never be complet~ly equated but defendants submit that in view of
j
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the fact that the children are presently being adequately
supported and the trust funds can be reached for necessities, and considering the limited funds available, this
can be more nearly achieved by leaving the available
funds where they are, in trust.

CONCLUSION
Defendants submit that the Industrial Commission
has in no way exceded its statutory authority. It has
been granted discretion to disburse the available funds
in a manner conducive to the best interest of the minor
children to whom they were awarded, Roger Luke and
Jackie Sue Crain. From the record, it cannot be said
the commission acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable manner. Its decision should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
LEROY S. AXLAND
Assistant Attorney General
State of Utah
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendants
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